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Abstract
Lots of researches indicate that the inefficient generation of random numbers
is a significant bottleneck for information communication applications. Therefore,
Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) is developed to process a scalable fixed-
point method for random streams generation. In our previous researches, we have
proposed a technique by applying some well-defined discrete chaotic iterations
that satisfy the reputed Devaney’s definition of chaos, namely chaotic iterations
(CI). We have formerly proven that the generator with CI can provide qualified
chaotic random numbers. In this paper, this generator based on chaotic iterations
is optimally redesigned for FPGA device. By doing so, the generation rate can be
largely improved. Analyses show that these hardware generators can also provide
good statistical chaotic random bits and can be cryptographically secure too. An
application in the information hiding security field is finally given as an illustrative
example.
1 Introduction
The extremely rapid development of the Internet brings more and more attention to the
information security techniques, such as text, image, or video encryption, etc. As a
result, highly qualified random sequences, as an inseparable part of encryption tech-
niques, are urgently required. There are two kinds of random sequences: real random
sequences generated by physical methods and pseudorandom sequences generated by
algorithm simulations, which are in accordance with some kind of probability distribu-
tions. The implementation methods for different classes of random number generators
are visualized in Figure 1. However, the constructions of the real random sequences
are usually poor in speed and efficiency, and require considerably more storage space
as well, and these defects restrict their usage in modern cryptography. On the one
hand, field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) have been successfully used for real-
izing the speed requirement in pseudorandom sequence generation, due to their high
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Figure 1: Classification of random number generators
parallelization capability [13, 15, 25]. Advantages of such physical generation way en-
compass performance, design time, power consumption flexibility, and cost. On the
other hand, there is a growing interest to use chaotic dynamical systems as PRNGs,
among other things due to the unpredictability and distorted-like properties of such
systems ( [14, 17, 21]). Nowadays, such chaos-based generators have also been suc-
cessfully used to strengthen optical communications [20].
A short overview of our previous researches is given thereafter. It has firstly been
stated that a tool called chaotic iterations (CIs), used in distributed computing, satisfies
the chaotic property as it is defined by Devaney [16]. The chaotic behavior of CIs has
then been exploited to obtain a class of unpredictable PRNGs [8]. This class receives
two given, potentially defective, generators as input and mix them with chaotic itera-
tions, producing by doing so a sequence having a better random profile than the two
inputs taken alone [4]. Then, in [5], two new versions of such “CIPRNGs” have been
proposed, involving respectively two logistic maps and two XORshifts.
In this paper, we continue the works initiated in [4, 5, 7, 8]: the two approaches
introduced before are merged by proposing a discrete chaos-based generator designed
on FPGA. The idea is to improve the efficiency of our formerly proposed generators,
without any lack of chaos properties. To do so, a new model of CIPRNG Version 1 [8]
on Field Programmable Gate Array is introduced and its security is proven in some
cases. Additionally, the randomness of this novel proposal is evaluated by the famous
NIST test suite (widely used as a randomness standard battery of tests [23]). Last
but not the least, a potential usage of this generator in a cryptographic application is
presented.
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2 Definitions and terminologies
2.1 Notations
~1; N → {1, 2, . . . ,N}
S n → the nth term of a sequence S = (S 1, S 2, . . .)
vi → the ith component of a vector: v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn)
strategy → a sequence which elements belong in ~1; N
S → the set of all strategies
XN → the set of sequences belonging into X
Ckn → the binomial coefficient
(
n
k
)
= n!k!(n−k)!
+ → the integer addition
 and → the usual shift operators
N∗ → the set of positive integers {1,2,3,...}
& → the bitwise AND
⊕ → the bitwise exclusive or between two integers.
2.2 Blum Blum Shub and XORshift
The Blum Blum Shub generator [12] (usually denoted by BBS) takes the form:
xn+1 = (xn)2 mod m, yn+1 = xn+1 mod log(log(m)),
where m is the product of two prime numbers (these prime numbers need to be congru-
ent to 3 modulus 4), and yn is the returned binary sequence.
Algorithm 1 XORshift algorithm
Input: x (a 64-bit word)
Output: r (a 64-bit word)
Parameters: a, b, c (integers)
1: x← x ⊕ (x  a);
2: x← x ⊕ (x  b);
3: x← x ⊕ (x  c);
4: r ← x;
5: An arbitrary round of XORshift
XORshift, on its part, is a category of very fast PRNGs designed by George Marsaglia
[22]. Algorithm 1 shows its working procedure. The values of a, b, c decide the offsets
of shifting.
2.3 Chaotic iterations
Definition 1 The set B denoting {0, 1}, let f : BN −→ BN be an “iteration” function
and S ∈ S be a strategy. Then, the so-called chaotic iterations are defined by [24]:
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
x0 ∈ BN ,
∀n ∈ N∗,∀i ∈ ~1; N, xni =
{
xn−1i if S
n , i
f (xn−1)S n if S n = i.
(1)
In other words, at the nth iteration, only the S n−th cell is “iterated”. Note that in
a more general formulation, S n can be a subset of components and f (xn−1)S n can be
replaced by f (xk)S n , where k < n, describing for example delays transmission. For the
general definition of such chaotic iterations, see, e.g., [24].
Chaotic iterations generate a set of vectors (Boolean vectors in this paper), they
are defined by an initial state x0, an iteration function f , and a strategy S said to be a
“chaotic strategy”. Being an iterative process producing binary vectors given a “seed”
x0, such chaotic iterations can be used as pseudorandom number generators. The math-
ematical fundations of such a contruction is recalled in the next section.
2.4 Chaotic iterations as PRNG
Our generator denoted by CI f (PRNG1, PRNG2) is designed by the following process.
Let N ∈ N∗,N > 2. Some chaotic iterations are fulfilled, with f as iteration func-
tion and PRNG1 for strategy, to generate a sequence (xn)n∈N ∈
(
BN
)N
of Boolean
vectors: the successive states of the iterated system. Some of these vectors are ran-
domly extracted using PRNG2, and their components constitute our pseudorandom bit
flow.
Chaotic iterations are realized as follows. Initial state x0 ∈ BN is a Boolean vector
taken as a seed and chaotic strategy (S n)n∈N ∈ ~1,NN is constructed with PRNG2.
Lastly, iterate function f is the vectorial Boolean negation
f0 : (x1, ..., xN) ∈ BN 7−→ (x1, ..., xN) ∈ BN.
To sum up, at each iteration only S i-th component of state Xn is updated, as follows
xni =

xn−1i if i , S
i,
xn−1i if i = S
i.
(2)
Finally, letM be a finite subset of N∗. Some xn are selected by a sequence mn as
the pseudorandom bit sequence of our generator, (mn)n∈N ∈ MN . So, the generator
returns the following values: the components of xm
0
, followed by the components of
xm
0+m1 , followed by the components of xm
0+m1+m2 , etc. In other words, the generator
returns the following bits:
xm01 x
m0
2 x
m0
3 . . . x
m0
N x
m0+m1
1 x
m0+m1
2 . . . x
m0+m1
N x
m0+m1+m2
1 . . .
or the following integers:
xm0 xm0+m1 xm0+m1+m2 . . .
In details, when considering the Boolean negation and two integer sequences p and
q, we obtain the CIPRNG(p,q) version 1 published in [27]: p is S and the output of
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the generator is the subsequence
(
xσ(n)
)
n∈N, where σ(0) = q
0 and σ(n + 1) = σ(n) +
qn. Reason to be of the sequence q is that, between two iterates of chaotic iterations,
at most 1 bit will change in the vector, and thus the sequence (xn) cannot pass any
statistical test: we must extract a subsequence (xσ(n)) of (xn) to produce the outputs.
CIPRNG(p,q) version 2, for its part, will extract a subsequence from the strategy S = p
to prevent from negating several times a same position between two outputs.
Example 1 If we consider the Boolean negation for f , then chaotic iterations of Defi-
nition 1 can be rewritten as: xn+1 = xn ⊕ sn, where sn ∈ ~0, 2N−1 is such that its k−th
binary digit is 1 if and only if k ∈ S n. Such a particular chaotic iterations will be our
generator called XOR CIPRNG [9].
2.5 PRNGs based on chaotic iterations
Let us now recall with more details some previous works in the field of CIPRNGs:
chaotic iteration based pseudorandom number generators.
2.5.1 CIPRNG(PRNG1,PRNG2): Version 1
Let PRNG1 and PRNG2 be two given generators provided as input, or “entropy sources”.
The objective of the CIPRNG approach is to mix them together using chaotic iterations,
in such a way that chaos improve their statistics against well-known batteries of tests,
while the speed of the resulted mixed PRNGs is of the same order than the slowest
input. Additionally, we will show in a further section that if the PRNG1 is crypto-
graphically secure, then it is the case too for the mixed CIPRNG(PRNG1,PRNG2).
Thus expected properties of entropy sources could be, for instance, speed for PRNG2
and security or good statistical properties for PRNG1, even though, theoretically speak-
ing, nothing is required for these inputs except that they must not be totally defective
(chaos cannot correct constant inputs for instance).
Some chaotic iterations are fulfilled (see Flow chart 2) to generate a sequence
(xn)n∈N ∈
(
BN
)N
of Boolean vectors, which are the successive states of the iterated sys-
tem. Some of these vectors are randomly extracted and their components constitute the
pseudorandom bit flow [8]. Chaotic iterations are realized as follows. The initial state
x0 ∈ BN is a Boolean vector taken as a seed and the chaotic strategy (S n)n∈N ∈ ~1,NN
is constructed with PRNG2. At each iteration, only the S i-th component of state xn is
updated. Finally, some xn are selected by a sequence mn, obtained using the PRNG1,
as the pseudorandom bit sequence of our generator.
The basic design procedure of the first version of the CIPRNG generator is summed
up in Algorithm 2. The internal state is x, whereas a and b are computed by PRNG1
and PRNG2. See Table 2 for a run example of this CIPRNG version 1.
2.5.2 CIPRNG(PRNG1,PRNG2): Version 2
The second version of the CI-based generators is designed by the following process [5].
First of all, some chaotic iterations have to be done to generate a sequence (xn)n∈N ∈(
B32
)N
of Boolean vectors, which are the successive states of the iterated system. Some
5
Figure 2: Flow chart of CIPRNG version 1
Table 1: Running example of CIPRNG version 1
m : 4 5 4
S 2 4 2 2 5 1 1 5 5 3 2 3 3
x0 x4 x9 x13
1 1
1−→ 0 1−→ 1 1 1
0
2−→ 1 2−→ 0 2−→ 1 1 1 2−→ 0 0
1 1 1
3−→ 0 3−→ 1 3−→ 0 0
0
4−→ 1 1 1 1
0 0
5−→ 1 5−→ 0 5−→ 1 1 1
Output: x01x
0
2x
0
3x
0
4x
0
5x
4
1x
4
2x
4
3x
4
4x
4
5x
9
1x
9
2x
9
3x
9
4
x95x
13
1 x
13
2 x
13
3 x
13
4 x
13
5 ... = 10100111101111110011...
of these vectors will be randomly extracted and the pseudorandom bit flow will be
constituted by their components. Such chaotic iterations are realized as follows.
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Algorithm 2 An arbitrary round of the CIPRNG Version 1
Input: the internal state x (an array of N 1-bit words)
Output: an array r of N 1-bit words
1: a← PRNG1();
2: m← a mod 2 + c;
3: while i = 0, . . . ,m do
4: b← PRNG2();
5: S ← b mod N;
6: xS ← xS ;
7: end while
8: r ← x;
9: return r;
• Initial state x0 ∈ BN is a Boolean vector taken as a seed.
• Chaotic strategy (S n)n∈N ∈ ~1,NN is an irregular decimation of the PRNG2
sequence.
At each iteration, only the S i-th component of state xn is updated using the vectorial
negation, as follows: xni = x
n−1
i if i , S
i, else xni = x
n−1
i . Finally, some x
n are selected
by a sequence mn as the pseudorandom bit sequence of our generator, where (mn)n∈N ∈
MN is computed from PRNG1. The basic design procedure of this CIPRNG Version
2 generator is summarized in Algorithm 3. The internal state is x. a and b are those
computed by the two inputted PRNGs. Finally, the value m is the integers sequence
defined in Eq.(3).
mn = g1(S n) =

0 if 0 6 S n < C032,
1 if C032 6 S
n <
∑1
i=0 C
i
32,
2 if
∑1
i=0 C
i
32 6 S
n <
∑2
i=0 C
i
32,
...
...
N if
∑N−1
i=0 C
i
32 6 S
n < 1.
(3)
3 Security Analysis of CIPRNG Version 1
In this section the concatenation of two strings u and v is classically denoted by uv.
In a cryptographic context, a pseudorandom generator is a deterministic algorithm G
transforming strings into strings and such that, for any seed s of length m, G(s) (the
output of G on the input s) has size lG(m) with lG(m) > m. The notion of secure PRNGs
can now be defined as follows.
3.1 Algorithm expression conversion
For the convenience of security analysis, CIPRNG Version 1 detailed in Algorithm 2
is converted as in Eq.(4), where internal state is x, S and T are those computed by
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Algorithm 3 An arbitrary round of the CIPRNG Version 2
Input: the internal state x (N bits)
Output: a state r of N bits
1: for i = 0, . . . ,N do
2: di ← 0
3: end for
4: a← PRNG1()
5: m← g1(a)
6: k ← m
7: while i = 0, . . . , k do
8: b← PRNG2() mod N
9: S ← b
10: if dS = 0 then
11: xS ← xS
12: dS ← 1
13: else if dS = 1 then
14: k ← k + 1
15: end if
16: end while
17: r ← x
18: return r
PRNG1 and PRNG2, whereas at each round, xn−1 is updated to xn.
x0 ∈ ~0, 2N − 1, S ∈ ~0, 2N − 1N,T ∈ ~0, 2N − 1N
C = S n&1 + 3 ∗ N
w0 = Tm mod N,w1 = Tm+1&3, ...wC−1 = Tm+C−1&3
dn = (1  w0) ⊕ (1  w1) ⊕ ...(1  wC−1)
∀n ∈ N∗, xn = xn−1 ⊕ dn.
(4)
3.2 Security notion
Definition 2 A cryptographic PRNG G is secure if for any probabilistic polynomial
time algorithm D, for any polynomial p, and for all sufficiently large m’s,
|Pr[D(G(Um)) = 1] − Pr[D(UlG(m)) = 1] <
1
p(m)
, (5)
where Ur is the uniform distribution over {0, 1}r and the probabilities are taken over
Um, UlG(m) as well as over the internal coin tosses of D.
Intuitively, it means that there is no polynomial time algorithm that can distinguish
a perfect uniform random generator from G with a non negligible probability. Note
that it is quite easily possible to change the function l into any polynomial function l′
satisfying l′(m) > m.
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The generation schema developed in Eq.4 is based on two pseudorandom genera-
tors. Let H be the “PRNG1” and I be the “PRNG2”. We may assume, without loss of
generality, that for any string S 0 of size L, the size of H(S 0) is kL, then for any string
T0 of size M, it has I(T0) with kN, k > 2. It means that lH(N) = kL and lI(N) = kM.
Let S 1, ..., S k be the string of length L such that H(S 0) = S 1...S k and T1, ...,Tk be the
string of length M s.t. H(S 0) = T1...Tk (H(S 0) and I(T0) are the concatenations of S i’s
and Ti’s).
The generator X defined in Algorithm 4 is mapping any string x0S 0T0, of length
L + M + N, into the string x0 ⊕ d1, x0 ⊕ d1 ⊕ d2, ...(x0
⊕i=k
i=0 d
i), c.f. Eq.(4). One in
particular has lX(L+M+N) = kN = lH(N) and k > M+L+N. We announce that if the
inputted generator H is cryptographically secure, then the new one defined in Eq.(4) is
secured too.
Proposition 1 If PRNG1 is a secure cryptographic generator, then for all PRNG2, we
can have that X is a secure cryptographic PRNG too.
Proof The proposition is proven by contraposition. Assume that X is not secure. By
definition, there exists a polynomial time probabilistic algorithm D, a positive polyno-
mial p, such that for all k0 there exists L + M + N ≥ k0 satisfying
|Pr[D(X(UL+M+N)) = 1] − Pr[D(UkN = 1)]| ≥ 1p(L + M + N) .
Consider a word w of size kL.
1. Decompose w into w = w1...wk.
2. Pick a string y of size N uniformly at random.
3. Pick a string of size (3kN +
∑ j=k
j=1(w j&1))M: u.
4. Decompose u into u = u1...u3kN+∑ j=kj=1(w j&1).
5. Define ti = (
⊕ j=3N(i)+(∑ j=ij=1(w j&1))
l=3N(i−1)+(∑l=i−1l=1 (w j&1))+1(1 << ul)).
6. Compute z = (y ⊕ t1)(y ⊕ t1 ⊕ t2)...(y
⊕i=k
i=1(ti)).
7. Return D(z).
On one hand, consider for each y ∈ BkN the function ϕy from BkN into BkN mapping
t = t1 . . . tk (each ti has length N) to (y ⊕ t1)(y ⊕ t1 ⊕ t2) . . . (y
⊕i=k
i=1 ti). On the other
hand, treat each ul ∈ B(3Nk+
∑ j=k
j=0(w j&1))M by the function φu from B
(3kN+
∑ j=k
j=0(wi&1))M into
BkN mapping w = w1 . . .wk (each wi has length L) to:
(
⊕l=3N+(w1&1)
l=1 (1 << ul))((
⊕l=6N+(w1&1)+(w1&1)
l=1+3N+(w1&1)
(1 << ul))
. . . (
⊕l=3Nk+∑ j=kj=1(w j&1)
l=3N(k−1)+∑ j=k−1j=1 (w j&1)(1 << ul)).
By construction, one has for every w,
D′(w) = D(ϕy(φu(w))). (6)
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Therefore, and using Eq.(6), one has
Pr[D′(UkL) = 1] = Pr[D(ϕy(φu(UkL))) = 1]
and, therefore,
Pr[D′(UkL) = 1] = Pr[D(UkN) = 1]. (7)
Now, using Eq.(6) again, one has for every x,
Pr[D′(UH(x)) = 1] = Pr[D(ϕy(φu(UH(x)))) = 1]. (8)
Since where y and u j are randomly generated. By construction, ϕy(φu(x)) = X(yu1w),
hence
Pr[D′(H(UkL)) = 1] = Pr[D(X(UN+M+L)) = 1]. (9)
Compute the difference of Eq.(9) and Eq.(8), one can deduce that there exists a
polynomial time probabilistic algorithm D′, a positive polynomial p, such that for all
k0 there exists L + M + N ≥ k0 satisfying
|Pr[D′(H(UKL)) = 1] − Pr[D(UkL) = 1]| ≥ 1p(L + M + N) ,
proving that H is not secure, which is a contradiction.
Compared to stream ciphers, which are symmetric key ciphers where plaintext dig-
its are combined with a pseudorandom cipher digit stream (keystream), the CIPRNG
method can be described as a post-treatment on two inputted PRNGs, that:
1. add chaotic properties to these generators,
2. by doing so, improve their statistical properties when the inputs are defective,
3. while preserving their security, for instance when one of the input is cryptograph-
ically secure.
If PRNG1 is already used as a keystream in a stream cipher, because it is cryptograph-
ically secure, then the combined CIPRNG(PRNG1,XORshift), which runs potentially
faster than PRNG1, can be used too as a keystream. The security comparison be-
tween CIPRNG and other designs is thus summarized in Proposition 1: the security of
CIPRNG(PRNG1,PRNG2) is directly related to the one of PRNG1, meaning that if
PRNG1 is secure, then the resulted CIPRNG is secure too.
4 CIPRNG Version 1 Designed for FPGA
4.1 An efficient and cryptographically secure PRNG based on CIPRNG
Version 1
In Algorithm 4 is given an efficient and cryptographically secure generator suitable for
FPGA applications. It is based on CIPRNG Version 1 and thus presents a good random
statistical profile.
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Algorithm 4 An efficient and cryptographically secure generator based on CIPRNG
version 1
Notice: xorshift1, xorshift2 (64-bit XORshift generators)
Input: z (a 16-bit word)
Output: r (a 16-bit word)
1: x← xorshi f t1();
2: y← xorshi f t2();
3: z1← x&0x f f f f f f f f
4: z2← (x >> 32)&0x f f f f f f f f
5: z3← y&0x f f f f f f f f
6: z4← (y >> 32)&0x f f f f f f f f
7: t ← bbs();
8: t1← t&1;
9: t2← t&2;
10: t3← t&4;
11: t4← t&8;
12: w1← 0;
13: w2← 0;
14: w3← 0;
15: w4← 0;
16: while i = 0, . . . , 11 do
17: w1← (w1 ⊕ (1  ((z1  (i × 2))&3)));
18: w2← (w2 ⊕ (1  ((z2  (i × 2))&3)));
19: w3← (w3 ⊕ (1  ((z3  (i × 2))&3)));
20: w4← (w4 ⊕ (1  ((z4  (i × 2))&3)));
21: end while
22: if (t1 , 0) then w1← (w1 ⊕ (1  ((z1  24)&3)));
23: if (t2 , 0) then w2← (w2 ⊕ (1  ((z2  24)&3)));
24: if (t3 , 0) then w3← (w3 ⊕ (1  ((z3  24)&3)));
25: if (t4 , 0) then w4← (w4 ⊕ (1  ((z4  24)&3)));
26: z← z ⊕ w1 ⊕ (w2  4) ⊕ (w3  8) ⊕ (w4  12);
27: r ← z;
28: return r;
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Table 2: NIST SP 800-22 test results (PT )
Method CIPRNG XORshift BBS
Frequency (Monobit) Test 0.073128 0.145326 0.32435
Frequency Test within a Block 0.719128 0.028817 0.000000
Runs Test 0.314992 0.739918 0.000000
Longest Run of Ones in a Block Test 0.445121 0.554420 0.000000
Binary Matrix Rank Test 0.888124 0.236810 0.000000
Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral) Test 0.912003 0.514124 0.000000
Non-overlapping Template Matching Test* 0.500459 0.512363 0.000000
Overlapping Template Matching Test 0.702445 0.595549 0.000000
Universal Statistical Test 0.666230 0.122325 0.000000
Linear Complexity Test 0.475761 0.249284 0.000000
Serial Test* (m=10) 0.780099 0.495847 0.043355
Approximate Entropy Test (m=10) 0.679102 0.000000 0.000000
Cumulative Sums (Cusum) Test* 0.819200 0.074404 0.000000
Random Excursions Test* 0.697803 0.507812 0.000000
Random Excursions Variant Test* 0.338243 0.289594 0.000000
Success 15/15 14/15 2/15
The internal state x is a vector of 16 bits, whereas two 64-bit XORshift generators
(xorshi f t1(), xorshi f t2()) are provided as entropy sources. As it can be seen in the
algorithm, the two outputs of XORshift generators are spread into four 32-bit integers.
Then for each integer, there are 16 2−bits components that can be found; every 12
of these components are used to update the states. Lastly, the 4 least significant bits
(LSBs) of the output bbs() of the Blum Blum Shub generator decide if the state must
be updated with the considered 13-bits block or not.
According to Section 3, this generator based on CIPRNG version 1 can turn to
be cryptographically secure, if the PRNG1 entropy source is cryptographically secure.
Here, this inputted generator is the well known BBS, which is believed to be the most
secured PRNG method currently available [26]. The t value is computed by a BBS
with a modulo m equal to 32 bits. Then the log(log(m)) LSBs of t can be treated as
secure, this is why we only considerate 4 LSBs in this algorithm.
Following the approach detailed in [4], we thus have used chaotic iterations in
order to improve the statistical behavior of the inputted generators. Here, two coupled
64 bits XORshift generators together with one BBS are applied. By doing so, we obtain
in Algorithm 4 a generator being both chaotic and cryptographically secure [9].
Table 2 shows the test results of the proposed CIPRNG against the NIST bat-
tery [23]. Results of XORshift and BBS are provided too. According to NIST test
12
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Figure 3: The processing structure for BBS in FPGA (per clock step)
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suite, the sole BBS generator algorithm cannot produce a statistically perfect output.
This is not contradictory with Prop. 1, as the cryptographically secure property is an
asymptotic one: even though the Blum Blum Shum generator is cryptographically se-
cure (which is a property independent from the chosen modulo m), the very small value
chosen for m makes it unable to pass the NIST battery. Obviously, best statistical per-
formances are obtained using the proposed CIPRNG.
4.2 FPGA Design
In order to take benefits from the computing power of FPGA, a whole processing needs
to spread into several independent blocks of threads that can be computed simultane-
ously. In general, the larger the number of threads is, the more logistic elements of
FPGA are used, and the less branching instructions are used (if, while, ...), the better
the performances on FPGA are. Obviously, having these requirements in mind, it is
possible to build a program similar to the algorithm presented in Algorithm 4, which
produces pseudorandom numbers with chaotic properties on FPGA. To do so, Verilog-
HDL [1] has been used to help programming. In this generator, there are three PRNG
objects that use the exclusive or operation, two XORshifts, and a BBS, their processing
are described thereafter.
4.2.1 Design of XORshift
The structure of XORshift designed in Verilog-HDL is shown in Figure 3(a). There are
four inputs:
• The first one is the initial state, which costs 64 bits of register units,
• the other three ones are used to define the shift operations.
Let us remark that, in FPGA, this shift operation costs nothing, as it simply consists
in using different bit cells of the input. We can thus conclude that there are 64 − s1 +
64 − s2 + 64 − s3 = 192 − s1 − s2 − s3 logic gates elements that are required for the
XORshifts processing.
4.2.2 Design of BBS
Figure 3(b) gives the proposed design of the BBS generator in FPGAs. There are two
inputs of 32 bits, namely b and m. Register b stores the state of the system at each time
(after the square computation). m is also a register that saves the value of M, which
must not change. Another register b extend is used to combine b to a data having 64
bits, with a view to avoid overflow. After the last computation, the three LSBs from
the output of % are taken as output. Let us notice that a BBS is performed at each time
unit.
4.2.3 Design of CI
Two XORshifts and one BBS are connected to work together, in order to compose
the proposed CIPRNG (see Figure 3(c)). As it can be shown, the four bits of the
14
clock
xorshift1
xorshift2
bbs
CIPRNG
11111011001
10011000011
00101101010
10001001100
11000011001
011011010
01011101001
11111011010
00011000100
11100100100
00011011000
000010111
101
NAN
010101000
100110111
010100110
00000
11110000000
00100011100
00111100010
00111101000
10000010100
010001111
10110000001
00100011010
01010010100
01000100000
11110000101
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101
001010001
110101011
101110110
10100
00111000000
00101000101
10101000100
11110010001
01001000011
001000100
00111101001
00001001001
01011100011
10110010011
00010001111
101101011
000
001011011
100111011
011101000
00111
...
...
...
...
Figure 4: Outputs of each component in clock step unit
BBS output are switches for the corresponding 32 bits outputs from XORshift. Every
round of the processing costs two time units to be performed: in the first clock, the
three PRNGs are processed in parallel, whereas in the second one, the results of these
generators are combined with the current state of the system, in order to produce the
output of 16 bits.
In our experiments, the type EP2C8Q208C8 from Altera company’s CYCLONE
II FPGA series has been used. By default, its working frequency is equal to 50 MHz.
However, it is possible to increase it until 400 MHz by using the phase-lock loop (PLL)
device. In that situation, the CIPRNG designed on this FPGA can produce over 6000
Mbits per second (that is, 400(MHz) × 16(bits), see Figure 4), while using 6114 of the
8256 logic elements in EP2C8Q208C8. This is nearly 30 times faster than when it is
processed in continuous method.
In the next section, an application of this CSPRNG designed on FPGA in the in-
formation hiding security fields is detailed, to show that this hardware pseudorandom
generator is ready to use.
5 An Information Hiding Application
Information hiding has recently become a major information security technology, espe-
cially with the increasing importance and widespread distribution of digital media th-
rough the Internet [28]. It includes several techniques like digital watermarking. The
aim of digital watermarking is to embed a piece of information into digital documents,
such as pictures or movies. This is for a large panel of reasons, such as: copyright pro-
tection, control utilization, data description, content authentication, and data integrity.
For these reasons, many different watermarking schemes have been proposed in recent
years. Digital watermarking must have essential characteristics, including: security,
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imperceptibility, and robustness. Chaotic methods have been proposed to encrypt the
watermark before embedding it in the carrier image for these security reasons. In this
paper, a watermarking algorithm based on the chaotic PRNG presented above is given,
as an illustration of use of this PRNG based on CI.
5.1 Most and least significant coefficients
The definitions of most and least significant coefficients are shown at first, as they have
been formerly introduced in [11, 18].
Definition 3 For a given image, the most significant coefficients (in short MSCs), are
coefficients that allow the description of the relevant part of the image, i.e., its most
rich part (in terms of embedding information), through a sequence of bits.
Definition 4 By least significant coefficients (LSCs), we mean a translation of some
insignificant parts of a medium in a sequence of bits (insignificant can be understand
as: “which can be altered without sensitive damages”).
These LSCs can be for example, the last three bits of the gray level of each pixel,
in the case of a spatial domain watermarking of a gray-scale image.
In the proposed application, LSCs are used during the embedding stage: some of
the least significant coefficients of the carrier image will be chaotically chosen and
replaced by the bits of the mixed watermark. With a large number of LSCs, the water-
mark can be inserted more than once and thus the embedding will be more secure and
robust, but also more detectable. The MSCs are only useful in the case of authentica-
tion: encryption and embedding stages depend on them. Hence, a coefficient should
not be defined at the same time, as a MSC and a LSC; the last can be altered, while the
first is needed to extract the watermark. For a more rigorous definition of such LSCs
and MSCs see, e.g., [3].
5.2 Stages of the algorithm
We recall now a formerly introduced watermarking scheme, which consists of two
stages: (1) mixture of the watermark and (2) its embedding [6].
5.2.1 Watermark mixture
Firstly, for safety reasons, the watermark can be mixed before its embedding into the
image. A common way to achieve this stage is to use the bitwise exclusive or (XOR),
for example, between the watermark and the above PRNG. In this paper and similarly
to [6], we will use another mixture scheme based on chaotic iterations. Its chaotic
strategy, defined with our PRNG, will be highly sensitive to the MSCs, in the case of
an authenticated watermark, as stated in [7].
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5.2.2 Watermark embedding
Some LSCs will be substituted by all bits of the possibly mixed watermark. To choose
the sequence of LSCs to be altered, a number of integers, less than or equal to the
number N of LSCs corresponding to a chaotic sequence
(
Uk
)
k
, is generated from the
chaotic strategy used in the mixture stage. Thus, the Uk-th least significant coefficient
of the carrier image is substituted by the kth bit of the possibly mixed watermark. In the
case of authentication, such a procedure leads to a choice of the LSCs that are highly
dependent on the MSCs.
5.2.3 Extraction
The chaotic strategy can be regenerated, even in the case of an authenticated water-
marking because the MSCs have not been changed during the stage of embedding the
watermark. Thus, the few altered LSCs can be found, the mixed watermark can then
be rebuilt, and the original watermark can be obtained. If the watermarked image is
attacked, then the MSCs will change. Consequently, in the case of authentication and
due to the high sensitivity of the embedding sequence, the LSCs designed to receive
the watermark will be completely different. Hence, the result of the recovery will have
no similarity with the original watermark: authentication is reached.
5.3 The FPGA setting
The 32-bit embedded-processor architecture designed specifically for the Altera fam-
ily of FPGAs is applied in this information hiding specific application. Nios II in-
corporates many enhancements over the original Nios architecture, making it more
suitable for a wider range of embedded computing applications, from DSP to system-
control [2].
Figure 5(a) shows the structure of this application. The NIOS II system can read
the image from the HOST computer side. Via the bus control, pseudorandom bits are
produced into the FPGA and according to the CIPRNG. Then the results are transmitted
back into the host.
In Figure 5(b), the NIOS II is using the most powerful version the CYCLONE II
can support (namely, the NIOS II/f one). 4 KB on chip memory and 16 MB SDRAM
are set, and the PLL device is used to enhance the clock frequency from 50 to 200
MHz. Finally, the data connection bus NIOS II system and generator works in 32 bits.
5.4 Results
For evaluating the efficiency and the robustness of the application, some attacks are
performed on some chaotically watermarked images. For the attacks, the similarity
percentages with the original watermark are computed. These percentages are the
numbers of equal bits between the original and the extracted watermark, shown as a
percentage. A result less than or equal to 50% implies that the image has probably not
been watermarked.
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HOST PC
NIOS II
control bus
     CI 
Generator
processing
(a) General structure
(b) Schematic view
Figure 5: NIOS II setting in FPGA
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Table 3: Robustness agains attacks
Attacks UNAUTHENTICATION AUTHENTICATION
C
ro
pp
in
g Size (pixels) Similarity Size (pixels) Similarity
10 99.18% 10 50.06%
50 96.13% 50 54.44%
100 91.21% 100 52.04%
200 66.16% 200 50.88%
R
ot
at
io
n
Angle (degree) Similarity Angle (degree) Similarity
2 96.11% 2 71.41%
5 93.66% 5 60.03%
10 92.55% 10 53.87%
25 82.05% 25 50.09%
JP
E
G
co
m
pr
es
si
on
Compression Similarity Compression Similarity
2 81.90% 2 53.79%
5 66.43% 5 55.51%
10 61.82% 10 51.24%
20 54.17% 20 47.33%
G
au
ss
ia
n
no
is
e
Standard dev. Similarity Standard dev. Similarity
1 75.16% 1 51.05%
2 62.33% 2 50.35%
3 56.34% 3 49.95%
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5.4.1 Cropping attack
In this kind of attack, a watermarked image is cropped. In this case, the results in Tab.3
have been obtained. In Figure 6, the decrypted watermarks are shown after a crop of
50 pixels and after a crop of 10 pixels, in the authentication case.
(a) Unauthentica-
tion
(10 × 10)
(b) Authentica-
tion
(10 × 10)
(c) Unauthentica-
tion
(50 × 50)
Figure 6: Extracted watermark after a cropping attack (zoom ×2)
By analyzing the similarity percentage between the original and the extracted wa-
termark, we can conclude that in the case of unauthentication, the watermark still re-
mains after a cropping attack. The desired robustness is reached. It can be noticed that
cropping sizes and percentages are rather proportional. In the case of authentication,
even a small change of the carrier image (a crop by 10 × 10 pixels) leads to a really
different extracted watermark. In this case, any attempt to alter the carrier image will
be signaled, thus the image is well authenticated.
5.4.2 Rotation attack
Let rθ be the rotation of angle θ around the center (128, 128) of the carrier image. So,
the transformation r−θ ◦ rθ is applied to the watermarked image. The results in Tab.3
have been obtained. The same conclusion as above can be declaimed.
5.4.3 JPEG compression
A JPEG compression is applied to the watermarked image, depending on a compres-
sion level. This attack leads to a change of the representation domain (from spatial to
DCT domain). In this case, the results in Tab.3 have been obtained, illustrating a good
authentication through JPEG attack. As for the unauthentication case, the watermark
still remains after a compression level equal to 10. This is a good result if we take into
account the fact that we use spatial embedding.
5.4.4 Gaussian noise
A watermarked image can be also attacked by the addition of a Gaussian noise, de-
pending on a standard deviation. In this case, the results in Tab.3 are obtained, which
are quite satisfactory another time.
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5.5 Discussion
Generally, the quality of a PRNG depends, to a large extent, on the following crite-
ria: randomness, uniformity, independence, storage efficiency, and reproducibility. A
chaotic sequence may satisfy these requirements and also other chaotic properties, as
ergodicity, entropy, and expansivity. A chaotic sequence is extremely sensitive to the
initial conditions. That is, even a minute difference in the initial state of the system can
lead to enormous differences in the final state, even over fairly small timescales. There-
fore, chaotic sequence fits the requirements of pseudorandom sequence well. Contrary
to XORshift, our generator possesses these chaotic properties [10, 27]. However, de-
spite a large number of papers published in the field of chaos-based pseudorandom
generators, the impact of this research is rather marginal. This is due to the follow-
ing reasons: almost all PRNG algorithms using chaos are based on dynamical systems
defined on continuous sets (e.g., the set of real numbers). So these generators are usu-
ally slow, requiring considerably more storage space and lose their chaotic properties
during computations. These major problems restrict their use as generators [19].
In the CIPRNG method, we do not simply integrate chaotic maps hoping that the
implemented algorithm remains chaotic. Indeed, the PRNG we conceive is just discrete
chaotic iterations and we have proven in [10] that these iterations produce a topological
chaos as defined by Devaney: they are regular, transitive, and sensitive to initial con-
ditions. This famous definition of a chaotic behavior for a dynamical system implies
unpredictability, mixture, sensitivity, and uniform repartition. Moreover, as only inte-
gers are manipulated in discrete chaotic iterations, the chaotic behavior of the system
is preserved during computations, and these computations are fast.
These chaotic properties are behind the observed robustness of the proposed infor-
mation hiding scheme: transitivity, for instance, implies that the watermark is spread
over the whole host image, making it impossible to remove it by a simple crop. Reg-
ularity implies that the watermark is potentially inserted several times, reinforcing the
robustness obtained by topological mixing and transitivity. Expansivity and sensitivity
guarantee us that authentication is reached, as in an authenticated watermarking, MSBs
are taken into account, and even a slight alteration of these bits leads to a completely
different extracted watermark due to these metrical properties. Finally, unpredictability
plays obviously an important role in the security of the whole process againts malicious
attacks, even if this role is difficult to measure precisely in practice.
6 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, the pseudorandom generator proposed in our former research work has
been developed in terms of efficiency. We also have proven that this generator based
on hardware can be cryptographically secure. By using a BBS generator and due to
a new approach in the way the Version 1 CI PRNG uses its strategies, the generator
based on chaotic iterations works faster and is more secure. This new CIPRNG is
able to pass NIST test suite when considering software implementation, and to reach
6000 Mbps (with the throughtput is about 132/16 each processing round) in FPGA
hardware. These considerations enable us to claim that this CIPRNG(BBS, XORshift)
21
offers a sufficient speed and level of security for a whole range of applications where
secure generators are required as cryptography and information hiding.
In future work, we will continue to explore new strategies and iteration functions.
The chaotic behavior of the proposed generator will be deepened by using the vari-
ous tools provided by the mathematical theory of chaos. Additionally a probabilistic
study of its security will be done. Lastly, new applications in computer science will be
proposed, among other things in the Internet security field.
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